Ilan Shor, convicted in Moldova in the billion-dollar bank fraud case and living abroad, announced at the end of 2025 that he was leaving Moldovan politics. The move followed the failure of his electoral projects and the collapse of the career of his ally, Gagauzia governor Evghenia Gutsul, who received a seven-year prison sentence in a case involving the illegal transfer of Russian money.
In Chisinau, Shor had long been described as one of the main channels of Russian influence. He was accused of organizing paid protests, buying votes, promoting loyal candidates, and running anti-EU integration campaigns. The clearest example was Gutsul’s victory in Gagauzia: promises of cheap gas, higher payments, an airport, and a regional “Disneyland” never materialized.
After Shor wound down his activity, his protégés in other cities, including Orhei and Taraclia, also left office. In the author’s view, this showed that such projects depended on outside funding rather than durable voter support.
At the same time, Shor did not disappear from view. The article says that in Moscow he was involved in structures linked to disinformation ahead of the 2024 elections, appeared in projects connected to Eurasia, the A7A5 stablecoin, and the case of the tanker Marinera, detained in January 2026 on suspicion of sanctions evasion.
His departure, however, created a new problem for Moldova’s authorities. The EU is now more insistently demanding progress in areas where Chisinau must act on its own: judicial reform and talks on Transnistria. Internal pressure is also rising: poverty reached 34% in 2025, while annual emigration is estimated at 30,000-42,000 people.
Against this background, the author argues, a convenient political excuse has disappeared, one that allowed many difficulties to be attributed to outside interference. The authorities are now expected to offer not only geopolitical rhetoric, but tangible domestic results.