After Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei was killed in a missile strike, control of the country passed to the interim collective body предусмотренный by the constitution. It includes President Masoud Pezeshkian, judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, and cleric Alireza Arafi, appointed by the Guardian Council.
In an interview with Novaya Gazeta Europe, analyst Nikita Smagin said Khamenei’s removal by itself does not guarantee regime change. In his view, the system is functioning “according to instructions”: a transitional council has been formed, state control has been preserved, and there is no basis yet to speak of the Islamic Republic’s immediate collapse.
Smagin says Tehran had spent several years preparing for the natural departure of the 86-year-old Khamenei, expecting rival groups to compete for his legacy. The current transition, however, is unfolding under different conditions: potential contenders understand that any new leader could also become a target. For that reason, the main priority in recent months was not so much selecting a successor as preserving governability during the transition.
The expert stresses that Arafi should not be seen as a sole acting supreme leader. Formally, authority is divided among the council’s three members. Smagin does not rule out that Arafi could eventually keep the position, but he describes him primarily as a theologian and career cleric rather than a powerful politician. Earlier, possible key figures included Ali Larijani, Ali Shamkhani, and Khamenei’s son Mojtaba Khamenei, but, according to Smagin, the latter two have been killed.
“The Islamic Republic will not collapse overnight: fighting its own population is much easier than fighting Israel,” Smagin says, arguing that suppressing domestic protests requires fewer resources than conducting an external war.
In Smagin’s assessment, the regime is in deep crisis and has clearly weakened, but its fall would require the emergence of a force capable of taking power. He says no such organized opposition currently exists inside the country. Even if economic problems intensify because of the war and worsening ties with partners, that alone would not bring the system down. A real power vacuum, he argues, could emerge only if bombardments drag on and disorder spreads, but a few days after Khamenei’s killing there are still no visible signs of that.