Russian media are again discussing possible gubernatorial dismissals as a way to reduce public discontent amid growing social problems. The trigger was an October 13 report citing sources close to the presidential administration, saying the federal authorities may remove unpopular regional heads ahead of the State Duma elections scheduled for September 2026.
The names mentioned most often are Georgy Filimonov, governor of the Vologda region, and Vyacheslav Fedorishchev, head of the Samara region. Their names had also surfaced after another ranking of regional leaders was published. Yet as recently as summer, both were in the middle of the performance table: Fedorishchev was ranked 45th and Filimonov 47th.
Filimonov, 45, took over the Vologda region in 2023. He has drawn attention for a series of controversial public actions and conflicts: posting footage of a high-speed motorcycle ride, bringing the rock band Alisa to Vologda, supporting the Russian Community movement, clashing with Severstal, sharply restricting alcohol sales, and pressing regional doctors to deny women abortions.
Fedorishchev, 36, widely described as Russia’s youngest governor, became head of the Samara region in 2024. His name has also been tied to conspicuous public episodes: he released his own rap track, intervened in a conflict involving Yekaterina Mizulina and Yegor Kreed, and after reports about falling trust from the federal center, publicly dismissed a district official with a coarse remark over a damaged plaque on a memorial stone.
“Dismissals are likely. The main criterion is whether a governor is popular or unpopular. But these are purely technical changes, and they do not affect either the stability of the regime or the position of Russians,” former Moscow city duma deputy Yevgeny Stupin said.
Political consultants interviewed for the story differ in their assessments. Some argue that no high-profile reshuffle is being prepared and that the reports may amount to a media campaign against specific governors. Others say replacements are possible if the real approval ratings of Vladimir Putin and United Russia begin to fall, protests intensify, or winter exposes the severe deterioration of коммунal infrastructure. According to another source, the federal authorities rely on polling by VTsIOM and FOM, closed FSO sociological data, and FSB reports on discontent among elites and social groups.