On August 6, Donald Trump signed an order imposing trade restrictions on India over its purchases of Russian oil. The measure introduces an additional 25% duty on most Indian goods entering the US starting on August 27, and the rate could rise to 50% if those purchases continue. Combined with other tariffs that took effect on August 7 as part of a broader US campaign, the total duty could theoretically reach 75% by the end of September.
In comments for Novaya Gazeta Europe, economist and CASE European Center for Analysis and Strategies director Dmitry Nekrasov says India remains heavily dependent on oil imports: it buys about 85% of the oil it consumes, while Russia accounts for roughly 20% to 40% of that volume by various estimates. At the same time, the US is India’s largest trading partner, taking in 16% to 18% of Indian exports, or more than $100 billion a year.
Nekrasov argues that India’s direct gains from buying Russian oil amount to billions of dollars but likely do not exceed $10 billion annually, while the potential losses from US measures could be larger. Still, those gains are already concentrated among specific groups of officials and oil-sector interests, whereas the damage from sanctions would be spread much more broadly across the economy.
He also says that even a formal ban would be difficult to enforce. Much of the Russian oil reaches India through intermediaries, blended cargoes, and chains involving third countries, including the UAE and Singapore.
In practice it is Russian oil, but legally it is not,his argument suggests, meaning that effective control over origin would require a motivated and capable bureaucracy.
Nekrasov further argues that public pressure from Washington reduces the likelihood of concessions from New Delhi. In his view, compliance under overt US pressure would be politically toxic for Narendra Modi’s government, given its emphasis on strategic autonomy. In that context, he interprets Modi’s phone call with Vladimir Putin the day after the tariff announcement as a deliberate political signal.
Even if India reduces purchases, he says, that may not inflict serious damage on Moscow. Russian oil could largely be redirected to China, which already buys about half of Russia’s oil exports. He estimates the additional losses for Russian producers from logistics at about $1.5 billion to $2 billion a year, which in his assessment would not amount to a critical blow.