After the United States and Israel launched their joint operation against Iran on February 28, 2026, US President Donald Trump urged Iranians to “take power into their own hands,” calling it possibly their only chance for generations. The expected mass uprising never came. According to Ruslan Suleymanov, a Middle East analyst and expert at NEST Centre who recently visited Iran, even many opponents of the regime see an external attack as a threat to the country’s sovereignty.
The author notes that the idea of independence has been central to Iran’s political culture since the 1979 revolution. That emphasis is rooted in historical memory of foreign intervention, from the Russo-Persian wars and the Anglo-Soviet occupation during World War II to the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. For that reason, many Iranians, including critics of the authorities, view the current campaign as an attempt to strip the country of its autonomy and control over its natural resources.
Suleymanov’s interlocutors say their initial satisfaction over the deaths of top Islamic Republic officials quickly gave way to fear and anger once the strikes expanded to civilian infrastructure. According to the Iranian Red Crescent Society, more than 115,000 civilian sites have been damaged. The UNDP reported a 8.8–10.4% drop in GDP growth compared with the prewar level, another 4 million people have fallen below the poverty line, and food prices have risen by nearly 60%. Rights activists from Human Rights Activists In Iran put the death toll at at least 3,500.
“The mullahs deserve death. They brought the country to its current state. But that does not mean the whole country should die with them,” a cafe owner in Ardabil told the author.
Another factor is the lack of a recognized alternative to the current leadership. Despite Iran’s strong protest culture, demonstrations are often spontaneous and lack unified leadership. Some protesters had hopes connected to Reza Pahlavi, but interviewees told the author that he played no meaningful role during the recent repression. At the same time, many people are alarmed by Trump’s remarks about a possible redrawing of Iran’s map and by fears of the country’s breakup, including through the stoking of separatism.
Suleymanov argues that, in wartime and after the death of Ali Khamenei, any prospect of a “soft transition” has disappeared. Key posts have gone to figures from the most hardline wing of the IRGC, and the regime, in his assessment, is likely to combine harsher domestic repression with a more aggressive foreign policy. At the same time, critics of the authorities told him they are prepared to protest again after the war if a clear political program for change emerges.