On February 12, supporters of The Other Russia of Eduard Limonov staged a protest outside Roskomnadzor’s office in Moscow against the slowing of Telegram. The movement later said activists had been detained and beaten in different parts of the city, while three National Bolsheviks were sentenced to 15 days under an administrative charge of disobeying police. The party headquarters, which members call the “bunker,” was sealed off.
According to Novaya Gazeta Europe, the current “bunker” near Mendeleyevskaya metro station is rented from a sympathetic owner, and members fear they could lose the space after the February protest. At the same time, the group’s online channels combine reports about aid to the Russian army with criticism of the authorities over censorship, rising prices, and other domestic issues.
A source close to the party told the outlet that its activists support the Kremlin’s imperial course but believe it is being implemented incorrectly. According to this source, they reject elections as a means of change and, after 2022, tried to form their own unit for the front but were not allowed to do so. The same source said the organization is in crisis because any visible action quickly triggers pressure from security forces.
After Eduard Limonov died in 2020, the movement came under the control of a political council. Its coordinators are named as Mikhail Aksel, Olga Shalina, and Andrey Dmitriyev. Aksel, whom sources describe as especially influential, declined to comment, as did other members of the leadership.
Founded in 1993, the National Bolshevik Party became known for its high-profile actions and was declared extremist in 2007. Experts and former members interviewed by the publication describe it not as a rigid ideological organization but as a radical subcultural community whose former activists later adopted sharply different political positions.
Political analyst Ilya Budraitskis argues that The Other Russia’s current situation reflects a built-in contradiction: the movement remains within the Z agenda, supports the war, and still tries to preserve an oppositional image. In his view, the current Russian political system leaves almost no room for such a stance.