The pro-war Telegram channel Children of Arbat claimed that by September 15, 2025, Russia had recruited 292,000 contract soldiers, and that some of them had been assigned to a strategic reserve allegedly being formed since July. These figures were highlighted by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).
According to ISW, from the start of 2025 to mid-September, about 7,900 people per week, or 31,600 per month, signed contracts on average. The analysts note that the source does not specify what share of recruits is being sent into the reserve and how many are being deployed directly to the front in Ukraine.
ISW says lower casualty rates in the summer of 2025 and changes in Russian tactics, including the use of small infantry groups and infiltration tactics, may have allowed the command to avoid sending all new recruits straight to the front line. In the institute’s view, this may also indicate an intention to continue offensive operations and possibly prepare for a broader confrontation with NATO.
Military observer David Sharp told Novaya Gazeta Europe that the recruitment figures themselves do not appear new: earlier reports already pointed to roughly 1,000 contracts per day, which is below the pace seen in 2024. In his view, the Russian army is facing manpower difficulties, so building reserves is natural: they are needed to replenish attacking formations, reinforce existing units, or open a new axis of attack.
Military researcher Kirill Mikhailov said that, ideally, a strategic reserve should always exist, and that its absence has historically contributed to major defeats. At the same time, he stressed that the real question is whether Russia has the capacity to build one; he added that Ukraine also needs such a reserve, and that the Ukrainian armed forces are already forming an operational-strategic reserve in the form of Assault Forces.
Security expert Pavel Luzin noted that in Russia’s system, reserve in the broad sense includes reservists, those in the military register, citizens fit for service, and conscripts, while on the battlefield reserve refers to forces in the rear or on inactive sectors of the front. He said it is entirely plausible that such forces could be accumulated for further escalation. Sharp, however, rejected the idea that this points to preparation for war with NATO: in his view, Russia has been stripping its NATO borders of resources, and there are currently no visible signs of offensive groupings being assembled there.